Crowd Tech Ltd review.

Overview

Trade360 is the trading name of Crowd Tech Ltd, a Cyprus Investment Firm holding CySEC licence 202/13 and Cyprus company number HE 297365. The distinction matters more here than at most brokers, because the contract a client signed was with Crowd Tech Ltd and it is Crowd Tech Ltd that decided to stop. CySEC’s register currently flags licence 202/13 as “Under examination for voluntary renunciation of the authorisation”, and the last archived capture of the firm’s own homepage, dated 25 January 2024, opens with a notice from Crowd Tech Ltd stating that it “has taken the decision to voluntarily renounce its license to operate as an investment firm” and that it “will no longer provide/carry out investment services and activities and/or enter into any business transaction with any person nor does it accept new clients”. Clients were told to close all open trades by 30 January 2023.

The public site is gone, and the way it fails is specific. Probing directly from our own machine on 29 July 2026, the TCP connection to trade360.com succeeds on port 443 and on port 80, so the host is up. On 443 it accepts the connection, receives our TLS Client Hello and then resets it before any ServerHello arrives, so no encrypted session is ever established. On 80 it accepts an HTTP request and then drops the connection without returning a byte. Both behaviours repeated on every attempt across several rounds, so this is the host’s settled state and not a passing fault. That is a machine listening with nothing configured behind it rather than a machine switched off. Certificate transparency explains the TLS behaviour: the last certificate covering trade360.com itself was issued by GoDaddy on 21 May 2023 and expired on 21 May 2024, so the apex has had no valid certificate for more than two years. The Internet Archive holds one capture since the start of 2024, the closure notice of 25 January 2024, and nothing after it.

The domain itself is not abandoned, which is a separate point and a more interesting one. The apex and www both resolve to 91.238.237.11, which RIPE records as a Belgian subscriber broadband allocation held by TECHIT.BE SRL, but other hostnames in the zone point elsewhere and one of them answers. welcome.trade360.com resolves to 54.37.166.245 and returns an unconfigured nginx default page over HTTP. blog.trade360.com resolves to 91.242.69.11, widgets.trade360.com sits behind a content delivery network, and platform.trade360.com resolves to 10.202.50.140, a private address that cannot be reached from the public internet at all. Certificate transparency shows Let’s Encrypt issuing for blog.trade360.com on 30 November 2025, for widgets.trade360.com on 1 December 2025 and for welcome.trade360.com on 29 May 2026, the last of those valid until 27 August 2026. Let’s Encrypt issues only after an ACME challenge is answered, so somebody was administering this infrastructure two months before we published. The registration is paid to 25 September 2026 through GoDaddy. What has stopped is the broker, not the domain.

What follows is therefore a record rather than a shopping guide. Everything below about accounts, spreads, platforms and payments is taken from Crowd Tech Ltd’s own pages and legal documents as archived between 2021 and January 2024, and each figure carries its date. The regulatory position is taken from CySEC’s live register and the FCA’s live register, both checked on 28 July 2026. We publish it because Trade360 was a real, licensed, EEA-passported CFD broker with roughly 10.7 million US dollars of segregated client money at the end of 2021, the brand still ranks in search, and a reader who finds a site or a caller using the Trade360 name today is dealing with something other than Crowd Tech Ltd.

Overview Table

Facts List

• Legal entity: Crowd Tech Ltd, Cyprus registration HE 297365, incorporated 22 November 2011, previously named MPF Global Markets Ltd.
• CySEC licence 202/13, granted 14 June 2013, flagged on the current register as under examination for voluntary renunciation.
• trade360.com appears as Crowd Tech Ltd’s approved domain at entry 46 on CySEC’s own List of Approved Domains.
• The licence covers reception and transmission of orders and execution of orders on behalf of clients, over instrument classes 1 to 10.
• Class 9 is defined by CySEC as “Financial contracts for differences”, so the CFD permission is real and sits on both services.
• Dealing on own account was never granted, and the firm’s execution policy names an outside venue as the counterparty.
• Retail loss figure published by the firm: 70.06% of retail investor accounts lost money trading CFDs with Trade360.
• Investor Compensation Fund member, cover capped at EUR 20,000 per client.
• Audited 31 December 2021 own funds of USD 1,362,060, a total own funds ratio of 120.76%, and USD 10,725,565 of client money, all of it segregated.
• Inactivity charge of USD 100 every 45 days once an account has been idle for 90 consecutive days.

Key Takeaways

The short version is that Crowd Tech Ltd was a genuine CySEC firm that chose to hand its licence back, told its clients so, and then went quiet. Nothing in the public record suggests it was ever a fake. Everything in the public record says there is no longer anything to join.

• Crowd Tech Ltd holds CySEC licence 202/13, and CySEC’s register carries the flag “Under examination for voluntary renunciation of the authorisation” against it.
• The identity chain is clean in both directions. The firm’s own footer reads “Trade360 is a trade name of Crowd Tech Ltd”, and CySEC’s List of Approved Domains records www.trade360.com against Crowd Tech Ltd at entry 46.
• The firm’s closure notice told clients to close open positions by 30 January 2023 and to withdraw their money, and promised to return anything left to the last known bank account or card.
• The FCA lists CROWD TECH LTD, FRN 622532, as no longer authorised with effect from 30 May 2023, under the business type “Services (UK) of an Overseas Firm”.
• Crowd Tech Ltd never held permission to deal on own account. Its own best execution policy names Hotspot FX (Pty) Ltd as the execution venue and says the firm acted as agent for every trade.
• The same policy warns that “Broker(s) and Liquidity Provider(s) are not necessarily operating in regulated markets”, and that the liquidity provider might pass orders on again.
• Retail clients had the full ESMA package: 1:30 leverage on majors, negative balance protection, a 75% margin call and a 50% stop out, and EUR 20,000 of Investor Compensation Fund cover.
• Costs were middling to high. The entry Classic account showed a 1.5 pip minimum and 1.8 pip average on EUR/USD, and a dormant account was charged USD 100 every 45 days.
• trade360.com accepts TCP connections on ports 443 and 80 but serves nothing: the TLS handshake is reset before any ServerHello and HTTP closes with an empty response.
• The FCA carries a separate unauthorised-firm entry for Trade360.io, a different domain trading on the same name. That is the live risk attached to this brand today.

Licenses & Regulation

Crowd Tech Ltd is on CySEC’s register of Cypriot Investment Firms as licence number 202/13, granted 14 June 2013, with company registration number 297365 and a registered address at 116 Gladstonos, Michael Kyprianou House, 3rd and 4th floor, 3032 Limassol. Beside the licence number the register prints, in red, “Under examination for voluntary renunciation of the authorisation”. The record also carries the line “Previous name: MPF Global Markets Ltd”, and the approved domain www.trade360.com. Crowd Tech Ltd does not appear on CySEC’s Former Investment Firms list, so the licence has not yet been surrendered, and it does not appear anywhere on CySEC’s Non Approved Domains list.

Read the instrument classes rather than the headline, because they decide what a firm may actually sell. CySEC’s own popover defines class 9 as “Financial contracts for differences”. Crowd Tech Ltd holds classes 1 to 10 on reception and transmission of orders and, separately, classes 1 to 10 on execution of orders on behalf of clients. Class 9 appears on both, so this was a properly permissioned CFD firm rather than a firm that could only pass a CFD order along. The ancillary permissions cover safekeeping and administration of financial instruments, granting credits or loans where the firm is involved in the transaction, and foreign exchange services connected to investment services. The firm’s own 2021 Pillar 3 disclosure lists exactly the same set, which is the corroboration we look for between a register and a filing.

What is absent is the permission that most CFD brokers rely on: dealing on own account. Without it Crowd Tech Ltd could not be the other side of a client’s trade, and its own best execution policy, version 1.2.5 of November 2022, says so in plain terms. “The Company will act in the capacity of an agent and not as a principal when receiving and transmitting client orders for execution.” It then names the venue, saying the firm “is the agent for all trades” and that its liquidity provider, HOTSPOT FX (PTY) Ltd, is the execution venue. The risk disclosure goes further, telling clients that “Each financial contract purchased by a trader via our site(s) is an individual Agreement made between that customer and one of our liquidity providers”. So the reader’s counterparty was a South African company that the CySEC licence did not cover. The policy adds that “Our liquidity provider may be transmitting the orders received by us to other liquidity providers” and that “Broker(s) and Liquidity Provider(s) are not necessarily operating in regulated markets”. Trade360 said Hotspot FX is regulated by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority in South Africa. We checked that on 29 July 2026 against the FSCA’s own FAIS register of authorised financial services providers, querying its search endpoint directly. Searches for Hotspot, HOTSPOT, Hot Spot and Hotspot FX each returned zero providers. The same endpoint in the same session returned 33 providers for Investec, 16 for Sanlam, 20 for the fragment HOT and 12 for the fragment Spot, the last including names such as CENTRALSPOT TRADING, so the search was working and matching on fragments rather than whole words. The name Trade360 published for its counterparty does not appear on that register. Two limits on what that proves: the FAIS search matches provider names rather than trading names, and we did not search the FSCA’s separate register of Over-the-Counter Derivative Providers, which is where a firm supplying CFD liquidity may sit. This is a negative result on one register, not a finding that the company was unlicensed.

On passporting, the CySEC record lists cross-border services into 29 other EEA and EEA-linked states, from Austria to Sweden, and the firm’s own regulation page reproduced a matching list of national authorities. Two things follow. The first is that this was an EEA business and nothing else: the record carries no “Provision of Services to Countries Outside EU” block at all, so CySEC has printed no third-country clearance for this firm. The second is a small overstatement on the firm’s part. Its page said Trade360 “is registered with the regulatory bodies listed below” and then named BaFin, the Banque de France, Consob and two dozen others. A passport notification is not registration by those authorities, and the same page mislabelled Hungary’s regulator with BaFin’s English name.

The UK position is a separate record and it has closed. The FCA register returns CROWD TECH LTD under FRN 622532 with business type “Services (UK) of an Overseas Firm” and status “No longer authorised” from 30 May 2023. Searching the FCA register for the brand instead of the entity returns one more thing that a reader needs: an unauthorised firm entry for “Trade360.io”. That is a different domain from the approved trade360.com and carries no reference number, which is the shape of an FCA warning rather than a licence. Nobody should read the two as the same business.

How to Trade

Trading is not possible. Crowd Tech Ltd stopped accepting new clients, told existing clients to close open positions by 30 January 2023, and said any trade left open would be closed by the firm at the close of business that day. This section records how the mechanics worked while they worked, because the shape of the arrangement explains where a client’s money actually went.

Orders were placed on one of two platforms and passed outward. Because Crowd Tech Ltd held execution and reception-and-transmission permissions but not dealing on own account, it stood between the client and a venue rather than taking the other side. Its best execution policy names that venue as Hotspot FX (Pty) Ltd and describes the pricing chain plainly: “The Company’s prices for each financial instrument on its trading platform are obtained through its liquidity provider.” The terms and conditions of April 2021 explain how the firm was paid for standing in the middle: “we derive our revenue as a fixed share of the spread regardless of you winning or losing deals from the counterparty through which we execute transactions”. That sentence is worth more than any marketing page, because it tells a reader that the broker’s revenue did not depend on client losses, and it tells them the credit risk on an open position sat with a company outside the Cyprus perimeter.

Order types were the standard CFD set. Market orders executed against the bid or ask on screen, buy and sell limit orders waited for a specified price, and stop loss and take profit orders attached to positions. The policy was candid that a pending order could not always be honoured at the price asked: “under certain market conditions the price requested by the client may not be available. When this situation arises, the pending order will be voided and the Company will execute the order at the next available price.” Slippage could run in either direction, and the firm reserved the right to refuse an order that was too large for the liquidity available.

Margin ran on published levels rather than discretion. The accounts page set the margin call at 75% of required margin for retail clients and 50% for elective professional clients, with the stop out at 50% for retail and below 20% for elective professionals. Retail leverage followed the ESMA caps: 1:30 on major currency pairs, 1:20 on gold, 1:10 on oil. An elective professional could take 1:500 on majors and 1:200 on gold and oil, and the firm’s own worked example put a client with a 1,000 dollar balance into a 340,000 dollar EUR/USD position at 34 dollars a pip. Position sizing went down to 0.01 lots on the MetaTrader 5 accounts. On the older proprietary platform the constraint ran the other way, through a minimum line that rose with the tier, from 1,000 on the Mini account to 1,000,000 on VIP.

Holding costs applied overnight at 00:00 GMT on indices, shares, ETFs and commodities, whether the position was long or short, with Wednesday night charged three times to cover the weekend and Friday and Saturday nights free. The terms reserved the right to change swap rates, leverage, deal size and spreads at the firm’s discretion. There was one punitive tier worth naming. If the firm believed a client had abused negative balance protection, section 26.8 let it move that client to the “Delta User Group”, where leverage dropped to 1:30 on currencies, 1:20 on indices and stocks and 1:10 on commodities, the trade-out level moved to 50% of equity, spreads matched the Mini account or worse, and the minimum deal size jumped to 100,000 US dollars. A minimum deal of that size on a retail account is close to a bar on trading.

Account Types

No account can be opened. Crowd Tech Ltd suspended new account opening before the end of 2022 and then announced it would not enter into any business transaction with any person. The ladder below is taken from the accounts page as archived on 2 December 2022 and is a record of what existed.

There were two separate ladders, split by platform and by the date an account was opened. The MetaTrader 5 side had three tiers. Classic asked 450 in dollars, pounds or euros, charged no commission per lot, and quoted variable spreads from 1.8 pips. Premium asked 10,000 and quoted from 1 pip, again with no commission. Zero Spread asked 50,000, quoted from 0 pips and charged 7 dollars per lot. All three ran at 1:30 leverage, allowed micro lots of 0.01 and carried the full instrument list. The published spread table gives the honest picture behind the headline: on EUR/USD, Classic showed a 1.5 pip minimum and a 1.8 pip average, Premium 1.0 and 1.2, Zero Spread 0.0 and 0.2. The advertised “from 1.8 pip” on Classic was in fact its average rather than its floor, which is unusually conservative labelling.

The older ladder belonged to the proprietary ParagonEx platform and applied to accounts opened before 13 February 2022. It ran Mini at 250, Standard at 1,000, Gold at 5,000, Platinum at 10,000, Diamond at 50,000 and VIP at 100,000, in dollars, pounds or euros. Each tier carried a minimum line, meaning the smallest deal the tier would accept, which climbed from 1,000 on Mini to 10,000, 50,000, 100,000, 500,000 and 1,000,000 on VIP. Every tier listed the same feature set on the page: the live CrowdTrading feed, trading signals, 24/5 live chat, Trading Central, push and SMS notifications and market updates. That uniformity is itself a finding. On the legacy ladder the money bought size, not service, and Trading Central was gated separately at a 1,000 deposit rather than by tier.

Three variations sat alongside the ladders. An Islamic, swap-free account was available on Classic and Premium, arranged by writing to support. A demo account was available before any deposit, which the accounts FAQ confirmed. And elective professional status was an application rather than a tier: a client had to meet two of the three standard MiFID II tests, which the firm listed as ten transactions of significant size per quarter over four quarters, a portfolio of cash and instruments above EUR 500,000, or a year working in a financial sector role requiring the relevant knowledge. Passing moved a client to 1:500 on majors and took away negative balance protection, Investor Compensation Fund rights and the 50% margin close out rule. The firm set those four consequences out side by side on its own page, which is better disclosure than this trade usually gets.

One rule cut against flexibility: multiple accounts were not permitted. The accounts FAQ answered “Am I able to open more than one Trade360 account?” with “No, we do not allow traders to open multiple accounts.” A client who wanted different conditions had to ask in writing to be moved between tiers. Two facts sit awkwardly together in the archived material and both are the firm’s own: the accounts page put the lowest entry at 450 for accounts opened after February 2022, while the Help Centre deposit page was still answering “Trade360 has a minimum deposit amount of US$250” in November 2022. The 250 figure was the legacy Mini tier that had already been closed to new accounts.

Negative Balance Protection

Retail clients had negative balance protection, and it came from the regulation rather than from generosity. Clause 7.9 of the April 2021 terms and conditions states that “the Company offers its retail clients ‘negative balance protection’ as per ESMA’s product intervention measures, which means that a retail client cannot lose more than his/ her overall invested capital”. The risk disclosure carries the same idea from the other direction, saying that “The maximum loss that may be incurred by any trader is the amount of money paid by him/her to the Company”, including rolling fees where the account type applies them. For French residents the terms added an automatic stop loss set by default at the initial margin requirement of each market order, which the client could tighten but not widen.

The protection stopped at the retail boundary. An elective professional gave it up, along with Investor Compensation Fund rights and the 50% margin close out rule, in exchange for leverage up to 1:500. Crowd Tech Ltd listed those trade-offs explicitly on its elective professional page rather than burying them, which is the right way round.

There was also a clawback. Section 26.8 allowed the firm to move a client into the “Delta User Group” if it believed the client had abused negative balance protection, or merely on “reasonable suspicion” of it. That reclassification capped leverage at 1:30 on currencies, moved the trade-out level to below 50% of equity, worsened spreads to Mini account levels or beyond, and imposed a minimum deal size of 100,000 US dollars. Since the firm elsewhere allowed 0.01 lot trading, a 100,000 dollar floor amounts to shutting the account down without saying so. The clause was drafted around the firm’s own judgement rather than a defined test, and a reader assessing a similar broker today should look for exactly that kind of wording.

The mechanics that kept accounts away from zero were published: a margin call at 75% for retail clients and 50% for elective professionals, and a stop out at 50% for retail and below 20% for elective professionals. Positions were closed starting with the largest loss. None of this is available now, and the protection has no bearing on a client still owed money, because negative balance protection covers losses on trades and not the return of a balance from a firm that has stopped trading.

Trading Instruments

Crowd Tech Ltd published a spread table covering six asset classes and described the range as over 500 CFDs. Everything was a contract for difference except one line of physical stock, and the CySEC permission that mattered, class 9, is the CFD class. The list below comes from the asset spreads page as archived on 2 December 2022 and is no longer tradable anywhere.

Forex was the deepest book, with 45 pairs in the table. The majors carried the tightest pricing, with EUR/USD, GBP/USD, USD/JPY and USD/CAD all at a 1.5 pip minimum on Classic, 1.0 on Premium and 0.0 on Zero Spread. Crosses ran wider, with EUR/NZD at 5.7 pips on Classic and GBP/NZD at 5.4. The exotics are where the cost showed: EUR/CZK was quoted at a 318 point minimum on Classic against 98 on Zero Spread, USD/TRY at 276 against 100, and GBP/INR at 450 against 80. A ratio of three or four to one between the entry tier and the top tier on the same instrument is a large gap by any standard, and it means the account a small client could afford was several times more expensive per trade than the one a large client could.

Commodities ran to seven instruments: gold, silver, crude oil, UK crude oil, natural gas, platinum and palladium. Gold was quoted at 0.75 on Classic, 0.5 on Premium and 0.06 on Zero Spread. Indices covered eleven contracts, including the ASX 200, CAC 40, DAX 30, Dow Jones, Nasdaq 100, Nikkei 225, S&P 500, WIG20, ES35, Hong Kong 50 and EU50, all of them quoted at a flat 5 point minimum on Classic, 3 on Premium and 0.2 on Zero Spread, with average spreads that varied widely by index, from 5.5 on the CAC 40 to 23.9 on the Nikkei 225.

Share CFDs and ETFs were priced as a percentage of notional rather than in points, and the percentage did not change between account tiers. US and EU shares were charged at 0.02%, UK shares at 0.40%, Polish shares at 0.20%, Czech shares at 0.03% and ETFs at 0.08%. A UK share therefore cost twenty times what a US share cost on the same account, which is the kind of asymmetry that only shows up if a broker publishes its table. Cryptocurrency CFDs were the most expensive line on the site: 0.5% on Bitcoin, 1% on Ethereum and 3% on everything else, again identical across all three tiers.

Alongside the CFDs the firm offered physical stock, marketed as commission free with an asterisk reading “Zero commission on stock trading does not apply to aggressive trading”. That phrase was never defined on any page we could retrieve, so a reader could not have known where the free line ended. Lot conventions were published and worth recording: one forex lot was 100,000 units, one oil lot 1,000 barrels, one gold lot 100 ounces, one silver lot 1,000 ounces, one gas lot 10,000 barrels, one index lot 10 contracts, one stock lot 100 shares, one ETF lot one share and one crypto lot one coin. Instrument availability was not uniform, and the firm noted that some currencies and commodities were unavailable in certain regions without saying which.

Education & Analysis

Research was the part of Trade360 that its own brand was built on, and it is the reason the legal entity is called Crowd Tech Ltd. The firm ran a sentiment product called CrowdTrading, licensed Trading Central signals, and shipped an economic calendar inside each platform. None of it can be reached now, and the tools themselves belonged to the platform rather than being downloadable, so nothing survives the shutdown.

CrowdTrading is worth describing precisely, because the name invites an assumption that is wrong. It was not copy trading and it was not a social network of followed traders. The firm’s own description is of an analytics layer over its own order flow: algorithms scanned the asset list, measured buy and sell volume over set periods and pushed events into a live stream called CrowdFeed. Four event types were named on the page: a new trend, a surge in positions, rapid activity meaning a change in volume or volatility, and a trend reversal. A separate sentiment indicator sat next to each asset showing the current split of buys and sells. So a client saw what the crowd on that one platform was doing and could act on it, but could not follow or mirror an individual trader’s positions. The About page put the ambition as putting a trader “in direct contact with the Trading Collective in real-time”, and the awards page recorded a 2017 “Most Innovative Social Trading Technology” citation from The European’s Global Business Awards. The heritage is real and the entity name follows from it. The mechanism is sentiment, not copying, and a reader who assumed otherwise would have been buying something different from what they thought.

Trading Central supplied the third party analysis. The platforms page described it as technical signals delivered three times daily, free with a funded account, and the accounts page attached one condition to it: Trading Central was only available on a minimum deposit of 1,000 in dollars, euros or pounds. A client on the 450 Classic account therefore did not get it, although every legacy tier down to the 250 Mini account listed it as included. That inconsistency was never reconciled on the site.

Charting depended on the platform. The proprietary WebTrader was advertised with over 120 technical indicators and charting tools. MetaTrader 5 brought 82 technical indicators and charting tools, 21 timeframes, six order types and four execution types, hedging and netting, the MQL5 language for custom indicators, scripts and expert advisors, and a multi-threaded strategy tester. MT5 could display up to 1,000 assets with market depth and tick charts, which is a larger universe than the 500 or so instruments the firm itself listed.

Education sat at the introductory level: articles on leverage, trading psychology, indices, stocks, CFDs, commodities, forex, ETFs and trading strategies, plus a blog, financial market news and a daily market report. There were no courses, no certification, no webinar programme and no demo-linked curriculum that we could find in any archived capture. The material was adequate as an orientation for a first-time CFD client and no more, which sat oddly with a product whose own risk figure said 70.06% of retail accounts lost money.

Special Offers

There are no offers, because there is no firm to take them up with. What Crowd Tech Ltd ran while it operated was restrained by the standards of the CFD trade, and that is a point in its favour rather than against it.

We found no deposit bonus, no cashback scheme, no rebate ladder and no deposit-matching promotion on any archived page or in the terms and conditions. The only inducement-shaped item was the marketing of physical stock trading as commission free, carrying the footnote “Zero commission on stock trading does not apply to aggressive trading”. That undefined exclusion is the weak point: a client could not tell in advance which of their trades would attract commission.

Two things that other brokers charge for came free with a funded account. Trading Central’s technical signals were included, subject to the 1,000 minimum deposit noted on the accounts page. Push and SMS notifications, market updates and the CrowdFeed sentiment stream were listed as included on every legacy tier.

The terms did address bonuses even though none was on offer, which suggests the firm had run them earlier. Section 26 lists bonus arbitrage, cash-backs and the mixing of deposited and promotional funds among the behaviours that could see an account reclassified into the restrictive Delta User Group. Anyone reading a similar broker’s terms today should note the pattern: a promotional clause that survives the promotion is usually a sign that the arbitrage rules have outlived the offer.

The one live consideration attached to this brand is not an offer at all. The FCA carries an unauthorised firm entry for Trade360.io. An abandoned brand with residual search traffic is exactly what impersonators look for, and a reader offered a Trade360 promotion today should treat it as coming from someone other than Crowd Tech Ltd.

Opening an Account

An account cannot be opened. Crowd Tech Ltd’s regulation page carried the line “Crowd Tech Ltd has temporarily suspended the opening of new trading accounts. Existing trading account holders will continue to be serviced” through late 2022, and the position hardened in January 2023 into a statement that the firm would not enter into any business transaction with any person and would not accept new clients. There is no application form to reach in any case, since the site does not respond.

The process, while it ran, was the standard three-step CFD onboarding the firm set out on its accounts page: register with a chosen account type and personal details, deposit through a payment method, then trade. A demo account was available first, which the accounts FAQ confirmed with “you have the option of switching to Demo Account to try out Trade360’s trading platform before placing a deposit”.

Verification was ordinary and enforced at the withdrawal rather than the deposit. The withdrawals page required know your client documents before any withdrawal request could be processed: a clear copy of a valid driving licence, passport or government issued identification, and a proof of residence. It added that where a substantial period had passed since the first deposit, the firm could ask for updated bank details or proof of residence again before releasing money. Front-loading the account opening and back-loading the checks is common in this trade and it is the arrangement most likely to strand a client who deposits quickly and cannot produce documents later.

Categorisation was decided at onboarding. Clause 3.5 of the terms is explicit that the firm accepted clients only in the category of Retail Client, and that a client accepted the client agreement on that basis, with re-categorisation available on written request and at the firm’s discretion. That default is the protective one, since retail status carried negative balance protection, the ESMA leverage caps and Investor Compensation Fund cover. Moving to elective professional required meeting two of three tests: an average of ten transactions of significant size per quarter over the previous four quarters, a portfolio of cash, deposits and financial instruments above EUR 500,000, or at least one year in a professional financial sector role requiring the relevant knowledge.

Two constraints applied to everyone. Only one account per client was permitted. And the account was personal: clause 15.1 required each client to warrant that they were placing orders as principal on their own behalf, unless powers of attorney had been produced and accepted. We could not find a published account opening time anywhere on the site or in the legal documents, so we leave that figure empty rather than guess at it.

Deposits & Withdrawals

Money can no longer move in either direction through the website, and the firm’s closure notice set out what was meant to happen to it. Clients were told to withdraw their available funds in line with the firm’s procedures, and that “Any remaining clients’ funds that have not been withdrawn by the Closing Date shall be refunded by the Company to the last known bank account and/or debit card of the Client”. The notice, as captured on 25 January 2024, gave [email protected] and +357 2526 2200 as the contacts for questions. Earlier captures point elsewhere: the contact page of December 2022 gave [email protected], and the order execution policy of February 2023 gave [email protected], so which address a former client was told to use depends on when they last looked. The phone number still appears on the CySEC register. The email domain, crowdtech.global, does not resolve in DNS at all, so mail to it cannot be delivered. That is the single most practical problem facing anyone still owed money by this firm, and it is why the CySEC register entry, which carries the same telephone number, matters more than any address on the old website.

Deposit methods, as published on the Help Centre in November 2022, were credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, e-wallets, online bank transfer and local bank transfer, with Skrill and NETELLER named as the e-wallets. The answer to “Are there any deposit fees?” was a single word: “No.” The terms added SEPA transfers to the list and noted that the firm did not guarantee every method was available in every country. Deposits could only be initiated by the client through the trading platform, other than local bank transfers wired directly.

Withdrawals ran on the same-method rule that is standard across the regulated CFD trade and worth spelling out, because it surprises people. Funds went back the way they came. Where the original deposit was by credit card, only an amount equal to that deposit could return to the card, and anything above it went out by wire to a bank account. Clause 8.4 of the April 2021 terms sets the minimum withdrawal at 25 US dollars, or 100 US dollars for bank wires. The firm charged nothing itself: the terms state that “The Company does not charge any fees for transferring the funds to you, but any expenses incurred by the bank, credit card company, payment processor or e-wallet for transferring the funds shall be borne by you.”

Timing was published twice and the two figures do not agree. The withdrawals page says under one heading that “We process all withdrawals within 3 business days of your request” and, a few paragraphs later, answers “How long does the withdrawal process take?” with “Withdrawals usually take 3-14 business days to be completed, depending on the chosen payment method”. A three day internal processing target and a fourteen day end to end wait are not the same promise, and a client reading only the first line would have been surprised by the second. The same page lists the reasons a withdrawal might be delayed: missing or incorrect bank details, technical problems, or “failure to meet minimum volume requirements”. A volume requirement standing between a client and their own money is the clause to look hardest at in any broker’s terms, and no page we retrieved defined what that volume requirement was.

The charge that would have cost a dormant client most was the maintenance fee. Clause 14.10 of the terms provides that if an account is inactive for three months, meaning ninety consecutive calendar days, the firm may render it dormant and “charge the Client account a fee of a fixed amount of $100 every 45 days in order to maintain the Client Account open assuming the account has sufficient funds”. Where the balance is under 100 dollars the firm could take a smaller amount and then notify the client of pending closure within ten business days. On the 450 dollar Classic minimum, two dormant periods would take almost half the account. Clause 9.8 separately allowed the firm to close any open deals after 90 days of inactivity.

On safekeeping, the audited Pillar 3 disclosure for the year ended 31 December 2021 recorded client money held of USD 10,725,565, all of it segregated and none of it held non-segregated, against the firm’s own funds of USD 1,362,060 and a total own funds ratio of 120.76%. The risk disclosure said client money was held separately from the firm’s money and that the firm aimed to hold it only with EEA regulated institutions, while warning that holding money outside the EEA would mean a different insolvency regime. Segregation is not a guarantee of return, and the disclosure said as much.

Customer Support

Support is the section that matters most for this broker, because the only people with a live interest in Crowd Tech Ltd are those who may still be owed money. The published channels no longer work as advertised, and one of them cannot work at all.

The contact page listed a telephone number of +357-25-262-200, an email address of [email protected], a live chat link and a fax number of +357-25-281-710. It claimed a support team “standing by around-the-clock”. The accounts page was more precise and less generous, listing “24/5 Live Chat Support” on every tier, which is five days a week rather than seven. Those two claims sat on the same site at the same time and only one of them can have been right.

Today the position is this. The telephone number +357 25 262 200 and the fax number +357 25 281 710 both still appear on Crowd Tech Ltd’s current CySEC register entry, alongside the Limassol address, so the number a client would call is at least the number the regulator holds. The email address CySEC prints for the firm is [email protected], and the domain crowdtech.global returns NXDOMAIN from every public resolver we queried, meaning it does not exist in DNS and mail to it cannot be delivered. The address the closure notice gave for questions, [email protected], sits on that same dead domain. The trade360.com domain does still publish MX records pointing at Cisco’s hosted mail service, so mail to [email protected] may still route somewhere even though the website does not answer. We have not tested delivery and we do not suggest anyone treat it as a working channel.

The formal complaints route is the more useful one and it survives the website. Crowd Tech Ltd published a complaint procedure policy dated January 2021, linked from its own legal index, and as a Cyprus Investment Firm it sat inside CySEC’s complaints regime. The Investor Compensation Fund is the backstop where a firm fails to return money owed, with cover capped at EUR 20,000 per client irrespective of the number of accounts or currencies, and the fund is triggered by an ascertained failure to return client funds rather than by a firm simply closing. A client in that position should be talking to CySEC and to the Fund, not to a support inbox.

One channel that a stranded client may still be chasing is worth naming, because it does not appear on the CySEC record. The archived regulation page carried the notice “Please note that Crowd Tech Ltd no longer collaborates with Athena Investments Dom Maklerski S.A. (AIDM) as its Tied Agent in Poland”. A tied agent acts for the firm and is how a Polish client would have been onboarded and supported. Anyone in Poland who dealt with AIDM in the Trade360 name should understand that the relationship had already ended before the wind-down, and that responsibility for their account sat with Crowd Tech Ltd in Limassol rather than with the agent.

Language coverage was genuinely broad while the site ran: thirteen versions, namely English, Spanish, German, French, Arabic, Czech, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Turkish and Vietnamese. Whether phone and chat support ran in all thirteen was never stated on any page we retrieved, so we do not claim it. We also have no verified user reports on response times, resolution rates or the handling of the wind-down itself, and we do not import ratings from competitor sites, so this section rests on the firm’s own published claims and on what the register still shows.

Prohibited Countries

Crowd Tech Ltd published its own exclusion list in the footer of every page, which is the right source for this section. The wording was: “The Company does not offer its service to residents of certain jurisdictions such as: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Iran, North Korea and Belgium. USA nationals are not accepted regardless of the country of residence.” The site added that its information was not intended for use by anyone in a country where that would breach local law, or by anyone under 18, and put the burden of checking on the visitor.

Two of those entries deserve a note. The United States exclusion applied to nationality rather than residence, so an American living elsewhere was excluded too, and the accounts FAQ repeated it: “Due to American Federal Trading Regulations, we do not trade with residents or citizens of the United States of America.” The Australian exclusion contradicts the firm’s own About page, which claimed adherence to “the regulatory requirements of ESMA’s MiFID-2 directive in Europe and ASIC in Australia”. A firm that excludes Australian residents has no need of an ASIC permission. We did not search ASIC’s registers for one, so we record this as an unsupported claim on the firm’s own site rather than as a confirmed absence.

The positive side of the picture came from the CySEC register: cross-border services into 29 EEA and EEA-linked states, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Belgium appears on the passport list and on the firm’s own exclusion list at the same time, which is not a contradiction. A passport is a permission rather than an obligation, and a firm may hold one and still decline to sell into that market.

Two national add-ons appeared in the terms rather than the footer. Spanish clients had to give a handwritten or spoken acknowledgement of the risk and complexity of CFDs before their first two trades, and had to be warned separately about the cost of closing a position immediately after opening it. French residents got an automatic stop loss on every market order, set by default at the initial margin used to open it and adjustable only downwards.

One thing we deliberately did not use. CySEC entity records often carry a block headed “Provision of Services to Countries Outside EU”, which lists countries a firm may serve outside the Union rather than countries it excludes. Crowd Tech Ltd’s record carries no such block at all, so CySEC has printed no third-country clearance for this firm. Either way, that block never feeds a restriction list here, because reading it as one inverts its meaning. All of this is now historical. The firm accepts nobody from anywhere.

Conclusion

Crowd Tech Ltd was a real CFD broker with a real licence, and it is closing itself down in an orderly way. Both halves of that sentence matter. CySEC licence 202/13 was granted on 14 June 2013, the register still carries it, the domain trade360.com sits against the firm’s name on CySEC’s own approved domains list, and the audited numbers for 2021 show USD 10,725,565 of client money, all of it segregated, against USD 1,362,060 of own funds and a capital ratio of 120.76%. Nothing about that profile resembles a scam, and we have found no regulator warning against Crowd Tech Ltd or against trade360.com on any register we checked.

What the reader needs to know is that it has stopped. The register flags licence 202/13 as under examination for voluntary renunciation. The firm’s own closure notice, still visible on the last archived capture of its homepage from 25 January 2024, says it decided to renounce its licence, would no longer carry out investment services, would not accept new clients, and required all open trades to be closed by 30 January 2023. The FCA cancelled its UK cross-border permission, FRN 622532, on 30 May 2023. Probing the site directly on 29 July 2026, ports 443 and 80 both accept a connection and then serve nothing, the TLS handshake being reset before any ServerHello and the HTTP request being dropped without a byte in reply, repeatably across several rounds, and the apex has carried no valid certificate since 21 May 2024. There is no account to open here and no service to buy.

The most useful thing this record preserves is the shape of the arrangement, because it is one a reader will meet again. Crowd Tech Ltd held permission to receive, transmit and execute orders in instrument classes 1 to 10, including class 9, financial contracts for differences. It did not hold permission to deal on own account, so it could not be the other side of a client’s trade, and it said so: it acted as agent, its revenue was a fixed share of the spread regardless of whether a client won or lost, and the contract on each CFD was formed between the client and a liquidity provider. That provider was named as Hotspot FX (Pty) Ltd, a South African company outside the CySEC perimeter, which the policy said might pass orders on again to venues that were “not necessarily operating in regulated markets”. A CySEC licence on the front door does not mean a CySEC-supervised counterparty behind it, and this firm’s own documents are unusually clear about that. We searched the FSCA’s FAIS register for that name on 29 July 2026 and found nothing, while controls on the same endpoint returned dozens of firms, so the counterparty Trade360 named does not appear there. We did not search the FSCA’s separate Over-the-Counter Derivative Provider register, so we stop at saying the claim is unconfirmed rather than false.

Costs were the weakest part of the offer while it ran. The entry Classic account at 450 quoted a 1.5 pip minimum and a 1.8 pip average on EUR/USD, three to four times what the 50,000 Zero Spread tier paid on the same pair, and exotic pairs stretched that ratio further. UK share CFDs cost 0.40% against 0.02% on US shares. Cryptocurrency CFDs outside Bitcoin and Ethereum cost 3%. Worst of all for a client who simply stopped paying attention, an idle account was charged USD 100 every 45 days after 90 days of inactivity, which would consume nearly half the minimum deposit inside a year.

Who this record suits is narrow and specific. It is for a former client working out who to contact, and the answer is CySEC and the Investor Compensation Fund, which covers ascertained failures to return client money up to EUR 20,000, rather than an inbox on a domain that no longer resolves. It is also for anyone who has been approached in the Trade360 name and wants to know whether the firm behind it is still trading. It is not, and the FCA already lists a separate unauthorised entry for Trade360.io, a different domain using the same brand. Our score of 4.2 reflects a firm whose regulation and disclosure were genuinely above average for the trade, whose pricing was not, and whose product no longer exists. Anyone comparing live CFD brokers should look elsewhere, and anyone told that Trade360 is open for business should ask which company they are being asked to send money to.

Three omissions here are deliberate and are recorded so that a later reader does not mistake them for oversights. There are no screenshots, because our capture tool fetches a live page and this site serves none; it reported the homepage unreachable, which is the same finding as the rest of this review. The structured product fields that normally carry a broker’s instrument list, platforms, payment methods and support hours are left empty, because those fields describe what a reader can buy today and the honest answer is nothing; the detail sits in the prose above with a capture date attached to each figure. And we ran the usual eleven-country sweep through a commercial proxy, 66 requests across both hostnames, every one of which failed. None of those failures carried an origin status code: they were navigation timeouts, proxy timeouts, one rate limit that never reached an exit node at all, and four empty responses. That is our tooling failing, not the broker refusing us, and on its own it proves nothing. The evidence that the site is dead is the direct probe and the certificate record described at the top of this review.

FAQ